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Institutional theory has been widely used to explain entrepreneurship in the informal economy. A first 
wave of institutionalist theory argued that informal entrepreneurship resulted from formal institutional 
failures and a second wave that such entrepreneurship results from an asymmetry between the laws 
and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions. 
This paper evaluates the validity of these two waves of institutionalist explanation and a new third 
wave of institutional theory explaining informal entrepreneurship in terms of a lack of both vertical 
and horizontal trust. Reporting data from a 2013 survey in Kosovo involving 500 face-to-face 
interviews with owners of small and medium-sized enterprises, 35.7 percent of sales are estimated to 
be unreported and a regression analyses reveals this is significantly higher among smaller and older 
firms, and firms owned by men. No significant association is found between formal institutional 
failings and the under-reporting of sales, but there is a statistically significant correlation between sales 
under-reporting and the level of vertical and horizontal trust. Taking account of the limitations of this 
single country study, the implications for theory and policy are then discussed.   
Keywords: Informal sector; entrepreneurship; Kosovo; development economics; institutional theory. 
1.   Introduction 
For much of the twentieth century, the predominant belief was that entrepreneurship in the 
informal economy²meant here as starting up and/or owning and managing a business 
venture that does not register and/or declare some or all its sales to the authorities for tax, 
social insurance or labor law purposes, when it should do so (Ketchen et al., 2014; Siqueira 
et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017a)²was disappearing with the natural and inevitable 
advent of modern formal economies. Enterprises operating in the formal economy were 
thus deemed the ³mainstream´ and appropriate focus of enquiry, and entrepreneurship and 
enterprise in the informal economy depicted as insignificant, waning and of little concern. 
Since the turn of the millennium, however, it has been recognized that two-thirds of all 
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enterprises are unregistered at startup (Autio and Fu, 2015), that at least half of all 
enterprises globally are unregistered (Acs et al., 2013). Additionally, an even higher 
proportion are engaged in entrepreneurship in the informal economy if the uncalculated 
number of formal enterprises under-reporting sales is included (Williams, 2018).  
This paper advances this emergent field of informal entrepreneurship by evaluating the 
contemporary scholarship that has explained entrepreneurship in the informal economy by 
drawing upon institutional theory (North, 1990). In a first wave of institutionalist theory 
on informal entrepreneurship, such endeavor was argued to result from formal institutional 
failures (Puffer et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013), while a second wave has explained such 
entrepreneurship to result from the asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; 
Webb et al., 2009, 2013). The contribution of this paper is to evaluate the validity of these 
two waves of institutionalist explanation and the evidence for a new, third wave of 
institutionalist thought that has started to explain informal entrepreneurship in terms of not 
only a lack of vertical trust (i.e., an incongruence between formal and informal institutions) 
but also a lack of horizontal trust (i.e., an incongruence within informal institutions).  
To commence, section 2 reviews the literature that has sought to explain informal 
entrepreneurship from an institutionalist perspective and to formulate hypotheses that 
evaluate the various institutionalist explanations. To test these hypotheses, section 3 then 
reports the data used, namely a survey conducted in Kosovo during 2013 involving 500 
face-to-face interviews with the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the 
analytical methods employed; a linear regression model. Section 4 then reports the findings 
while section 5 discusses the theoretical and policy implications. The outcome will be an 
evidence-based evaluation of institutionalist explanations for informal entrepreneurship, 
which displays the need to advance beyond explaining and tackling informal 
entrepreneurship solely in terms of resolving formal institutional failures. 
2.   Informal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Theory: Theoretical Framing 
and Hypotheses Development 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a small but growing literature on informal 
entrepreneurship (Adom and Williams, 2012; Aidis et al., 2006; Bureau and Fendt, 2011; 
Kus, 2014; Morris and Polese, 2014; Mróz, 2012; Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Welter et al., 
2014; Williams, 2006, 2013, 2015b; Williams and Kedir, 2016, 2017; Williams and 
Youssef, 2013). This literature has analyzed not only the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship (Autio and Fu, 2015) and the determinants of its variable prevalence (Dau 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Siqueira et al., 2014; Thai and Turkina, 2014), but also who 
participates (Williams and Horodnic, 2015) and their motives, including whether they are 
necessity- and/or opportunity-driven (Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams 
and Round, 2009; Williams et al., 2012). 
To explain entrepreneurship in the informal economy, and reflecting the literature on 
entrepreneurship in general, scholars have predominantly drawn inspiration from 
institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North, 1994; North, 1990). 
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Institutions from this theoretical perspective are the rules of the game that govern behavior, 
and any society is seen to consist of both formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and 
regulations) that set out the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions, which 
are the unwritten socially shared rules that exist outside of officially sanctioned channels 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Krasniqi and Desai, 2016), and are the norms, values and 
beliefs held by citizens and entrepreneurs regarding what is right and acceptable (Denzau 
and North, 1994). Viewed through this institutionalist lens, formal entrepreneurship is an 
endeavor occuring within the formal institutional prescriptions set out in the laws and 
regulations. Informal entrepreneurship, in contrast, is an endeavor occurring outside of 
formal institutional prescriptions but within the norms, values and beliefs of informal 
institutions (Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009; 
Welter et al., 2015; Williams and Gurtoo, 2017), while criminal entrepreneurship occurs 
outside of both formal institutional prescriptions as well as the socially shared rules of what 
is acceptable.  
Reviewing explanations of informal entrepreneurship from an institutionalist 
perspective, three distinct waves of thought can be discerned. Each wave is here examined 
in turn and hypotheses developed to evaluate the resultant explanations for informal 
entrepreneurship.  
2.1.   First-wave institutionalist theory: Formal institutional failings 
In a first wave of institutional thought on informal entrepreneurship, such entrepreneurship 
was explained to directly result from various formal institutional failures, namely resource 
misallocations and inefficiencies, voids and weaknesses, and powerlessness (Webb and 
Ireland, 2015; Williams, 2018).  
The first set of formal institutional failures relate to resource misallocations and/or 
inefficiencies by formal institutions (Qian and Strahan, 2007). On the one hand, these result 
from the ³misuse of public office for private gain´ (Pope, 2000; Svensson, 2005; Tonoyan 
et al., 2010), such as when government officials demand or receive gifts, bribes and other 
payments (e.g., a portion of a given contract) from enterprises and entrepreneurs, and 
provide a service in return (e.g., an operating license or construction permit). Such 
corruption acts as an additional tax formal entrepreneurs pay, which can push entrepreneurs 
into the informal economy to escape such extortion (Williams et al., 2016b; Krasniqi and 
Mustafa, 2016; Lajqi and Krasniqi, 2017). On the other hand, these resource misallocations 
and inefficiencies also result from formal institutions acting to protect or maximize 
economic rents for elites (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This arises when there is state 
capture, whereby firms or groups of firms influence the formulation of laws and 
government policies to their own advantage in an illicit or non-transparent manner (Fries 
et al., 2003). The outcome is they receive preferential treatment and state resources are 
diverted toward supporting them. For those not part of these elites capturing the resources 
of the state, the outcome is commonly overly burdensome taxes, and registration and 
licensing regulations and costs, which act as an entry barrier to formality for new 
entrepreneurs, and relatively fewer public goods and services in return for the taxes and 
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social contributions they pay (De Soto, 1989; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2016a). 
When the level of taxes paid does not correspond to the perceived value of the goods and 
services received, entrepreneurs will be more likely to operate in the informal sector. To 
evaluate whether resource misallocations and inefficiencies are an explanation for informal 
entrepreneurship; therefore, one proxy indicator that can be examined to begin to evaluate 
this is whether entrepreneurs perceived the level of taxes not to equate to the value of the 
public goods and services received. As such, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
H1: Entrepreneurs who consider taxes to be too high will have a higher under-reporting of 
sales. 
A second formal institutional failing resulting in the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship relates to the existence of formal institutional voids and weaknesses. 
Competing views exist regarding which institutional voids and weaknesses lead to a greater 
prevalence of informal entrepreneurship and which do not. On the one hand, a group of 
largely neo-liberal scholars have explained informal entrepreneurship to result from a 
burdensome regulatory environment and the existence of an excessively intrusive state 
(Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy 
1984). For these commentators, informal entrepreneurship is a rational economic decision 
to escape the over-regulated formal sector (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Schneider and Williams, 
2013). Informal entrepreneurs voluntarily operate informally to avoid the costs, time and 
effort of formal registration (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007; Small 
Business Council, 2004). Therefore, the formal institutional weakness for these 
commentators is that there is an over-intrusive state, which stifles the spirit of entrepreneurs 
through state-imposed institutional constraints (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 
2007; Small Business Council, 2004). To evaluate this, the following hypothesis can be 
tested: 
H2: Entrepreneurs considering tax administration as bureaucratic and a burden will have a 
higher under-reporting of sales.  
On the other hand, and in contrast to the neo-liberal perspective, a more interventionist 
groups of scholars have argued that state intervention is necessary; however, for this to be 
effective, entrepreneurs need to be informed about how their taxes are spent to maintain 
the ³social contract´ between the state and its citizens (Williams, 2017). Informal 
entrepreneurship, in consequence, is depicted to result from the advent of de-regulation 
and too little state intervention in the economy in de-regulatory regimes (Davis, 2006; 
Gallin, 2001; Portes, 1994; Sassen, 1996; Slavnic, 2010). Therefore, the solution is to 
increase the amount of state intervention in the economy to prevent the need for citizens to 
turn to informal entrepreneurship as a survival strategy (Small Business Council, 2004). 
However, this will only be effective if the social contract is maintained between the state 
and the population. For this to be achieved, there is a need to make entrepreneurs aware of 
how taxes are spent (Williams, 2018). To evaluate this, the following hypothesis can be 
tested: 
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H3: Entrepreneurs who are fully informed about the budget spending of their taxes will 
have less under-reporting of sales. 
A third formal institutional failing perceived to result in the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship relates to the existence of formal institutional powerlessness. This 
powerlessness is expressed in a lack of capacity of the authorities to enforce adherence to 
the formal rules (Webb et al., 2009). This lack of power of state authorities is often revealed 
in the low costs and high benefits of informal entrepreneurship, coupled with the low 
benefits and high costs of formalization. The result is that many entrepreneurs weigh the 
costs and benefits, and decide to operate on an informal basis. This is because the benefits 
of operating in the formal sector are insufficient to outweigh the benefits of participating 
in the informal sector.  
The consequent solution is to increase the ability of the authorities to alter the 
cost/benefit ratio. Two basic tools are predominantly used by authorities to do so. On the 
one hand, there are administrative sanctions and penalties. On the other hand, there are 
initiatives that improve the perceived or actual risk of detection (Williams and Puts, 2017). 
In many countries, the level of sanctions that can be introduced are constrained by what is 
SHUFHLYHG DV ³MXVW,´ VR HPSKDVLV LV JLYHQ WR LQFUHDVLQJ WKH SHUFHLYHG RU DFWXDO ULVN RI
detection, mainly by increasing the number of inspections. However, until now, the 
evidence has been inconclusive about whether this is effective. Some literature finds that 
increasing the probability of audit and detection reduces informality, at least for some 
income groups (e.g., Alm et al., 1995). However, other literature finds that increasing the 
probability of detection does not reduce informality (e.g., Webley and Halstead, 1986). 
Rather, it leads to increased non-compliance, not least because of a breakdown of trust 
between the state and its citizens (Murphy and Harris, 2007; Tyler et al., 2007). Therefore, 
to begin to evaluate this and the wider issue of the power of authorities, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
H4: Firms perceiving tax inspections to be more likely will have less under-reporting of 
sales. 
2.2.   Second-wave institutionalist theory: Institutional asymmetry 
In the second wave of institutionalist explanations for informal entrepreneurship, the focus 
in first-wave thought solely upon formal institutional failures has been recognized to ignore 
the role played by cognitive and normative institutions, which can be joined together under 
the broad category of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; North, 1990; Scott, 2008). Even 
if there are formal institutional failings, it has been recognized that informal 
entrepreneurship does not necessarily result unless the socially shared norms, values and 
beliefs of enterprises and entrepreneurs are not aligned with the formal rules (Dau and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Godfrey, 2015; Webb et al., 2009; Williams and Shahid, 2016; 
Williams et al., 2017a).  
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As such, in second-wave thought, it is not formal institutional failings per se that lead 
to a greater prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. If formal and informal institutions are 
³complementary´ and thus align, then informal entrepreneurship will not occur when there 
are formal institutional failings. Formal institutional failings only lead to informal 
entrepreneurship if there is incongruence between the formal and informal institutions, and 
thus the rules of informal institutions are ³substitutive´ and incompatible with those of the 
formal institutions (Godfrey, 2011; 2015; Williams et al., 2015, 2016a). As Webb et al. 
(2009) put it, ³the informal economy exists because of the incongruence between what is 
defined as legitimate by formal and informal institutions.´ If formal and informal 
institutions are not in symmetry, the result is informal entrepreneurship which, although 
formally illegal, is deemed socially legitimate (De Castro et al., 2014; Kistruck et al., 2015; 
Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2013, 2014). Indeed, the greater the degree of 
institutional asymmetry, the higher is the level of informal entrepreneurship (Williams and 
Shahid, 2016).  
As a result, this second wave of institutional thought has used proxy measures to 
evaluate this asymmetry between formal and informal institutions. One such proxy 
indicator is whether public sector corruption is perceived to exist. When corruption is 
perceived to predominate, the greater is found to be the level of institutional symmetry 
(Daude et al., 2013; Torgler, 2012). To evaluate the level of institutional asymmetry, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
H5: Entrepreneurs who perceive corruption as providing a high barrier to the operation and 
growth of their business are more likely to underreport sales. 
2.3.   Third-wave institutional theory: Vertical and horizontal trust 
The scholarship in second-wave institutionalist thought has so far focused almost entirely 
XSRQWKHOHYHORI³YHUWLFDOWUXVW´LHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDODV\PPHWU\EHWZHHQJRYHUQPHQWDQG
citizens) and its relationship with participation in informal entrepreneurship. Little 
attention has been given to the relationship between participation in informal 
HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSDQGWKHOHYHORI³KRUL]RQWDOWUXVW´EHWZHHQHQWUHSUHQHXUV+RZHYHULW
can be argued that entrepreneurs are more likely to under-report sales if they operate in a 
context where they perceive sales under-reporting as widespread. This is because they 
might then be less worried about the formal (and informal) sanctions, but also because they 
might consider that everybody else under-reports sales so see no reason why they should 
not do so.  
Indeed, there is an emergent evidence-base on the importance of horizontal trust but 
until now, only in relation to voluntary tax compliance, rather than specifically in relation 
to participation in informal entrepUHQHXUVKLS 6WXGLHV UHYHDO WD[SD\HUV¶ LQFOLQDWLRQ WR
comply is significantly associated with the actual and/or perceived behavior of their fellow 
citizens (Ajzen, 1991; Chang and Lai, 2004; Mendoza Rodriguez and Wielhouwer, 2015; 
Narsa et al., 2016). An experimental study conducted in three European countries 
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(Belgium, France and the Netherlands), for example, shows tax evasion increased 
significantly among participants who received information about previous studies 
revealing a low level of compliance, while those who received information about high 
compliance rates did not increase their subsequent tax evasion (Lefebvre et al., 2015).  
Therefore, to complement the second wave view that a lack of vertical trust is 
significantly associated with participation in informal entrepreneurship, a nascent third 
wave of thought can be discerned, which views informal entrepreneurship not only to result 
from formal institutional failings that produce an incongruence between formal and 
informal institutions (i.e., a lack of vertical trust) but also to result from a lack of horizontal 
trust. To test this, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
H6: Entrepreneurs who do not perceive others to pay their taxes are more likely to have a 
higher under-reporting of sales. 
3.   Data and Variables 
3.1.   Data and sample 
To evaluate these hypotheses explaining informal entrepreneurship, data is here reported 
from a small and medium enterprise survey in Kosovo, conducted by the Business Support 
Centre Kosovo (BSCK) in 2013 and funded by SPARK through the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry (for details, see BSCK 2013). This survey used face-to-face interviews with 500 
Kosovan entrepreneurs conducted by the BSCK team and one of the authors of this paper, 
who had a lead role in the research project. Interviews were conducted by experienced and 
trained finalǦyear students in the Faculty of Economics at the University of Pristina and 
these were monitored carefully by the BSCK research team. The respondents were the 
owners of the enterprises.  
The sample was selected randomly from the business register at the Kosovo Business 
Registration Agency (KBRA). The sample was stratified based on three sectors (trade, 
services and manufacturing) and three company size cohorts based on number of 
employees (less than ten employees; 10-49 employees; 50 or more employees). No 
company size limits were applied in the sampling to ensure the representativeness of the 
overall private sector in Kosovo. The sample has the following sectorial distribution of 
firms: trade 55.6 percent, services 27.0 percent and manufacturing 17.4 percent. Around 
19 percent of the firms selected using the public records kept at KBRA could not be 
surveyed because they either had terminated their operations or could not be reached. Table 
A1 details the variables used in the analysis and includes descriptive statistics on the 
sample of firms surveyed. Overall, the mean size of the firms surveyed (measured by 
number of employees) was small, with around eleven employees. It also reveals the mean 
age of firms surveyed was 11.6 years. Both size and age indicators suggest an initial stage 
of the development of private sector in Kosovo (see Krasniqi, 2012). 
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The questionnaire gathered data on how entrepreneurs perceive the business 
environment and its impacts on the growth and operations of their businesses. Background 
data was also gathered on the HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶JHQGHUDJH and education, as well as firm 
level factors such as firm size, firm age and whether it was in an urban or rural location. In 
relation to this paper, the questionnaire included a question on under-reporting sales and 
their views on paying taxes, tax rates, tax administration, inspections from tax authorities, 
corruption and whether other entrepreneurs in the same sector under-report sales.   
3.2.   Variables  
In recent years, there has been recognition that because participation in the informal 
economy is socially legitimate from the viewpoint of informal institutions, even if it is 
illegal in terms of the formal institutions, respondents will discuss openly with interviewers 
their participation (Kazemier, 2014; Williams, 2015a). However, until now, this has only 
been applied by asking direct questions on participation in citizenship surveys (e.g., 
Williams, 2004). It has not been applied when conducting firm surveys where respondents 
continue to be asked indirectly about their engagement in the informal economy 
(Abdixhiku et al., 2017; Fries et al., 2003; Putni৆ãDQG6DXND5). To analyze the above 
hypotheses, this survey continues this tradition of asking indirectly about participation. The 
dependent variable is a continuous variable extracted from the following question, 
³$FFRUGLQJWR\RXUYLHZ, what is the percentage of sales reported to tax authorities for a 
business similar to you in your sector of operations?´(DFKUHVSRQVHZDVVXEWUDFWHGIURP
100 to produce unreported sales.     
To analyze the hypotheses regarding the levels of unreported sales across enterprises 
in Kosovo, and based on previous studies displaying which individual variables influence 
participation in informal entrepreneurship (Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams et al., 
2017a), data has been collected on the following individual- and firm-level control 
variables: 
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for a female entrepreneur and 0 otherwise.  
x Age of the entrepreneur: a continuous variable for their age.  
x University Education: a categorical variable for the educational level with value 1 for 
university education, and 0 for primary education as a reference base category.   
x Secondary education: a categorical variable for the educational level with value 1 for 
secondary education and 0 for primary education as a reference base category. 
x Urban: a dummy variable with value of 1 for firms located in urban areas, 0 for firms 
located in rural areas. 
x Firm age: number of years the firm has been operating. 
x Firm size: natural logarithm of the number of employees at the beginning of the year 
of the survey.  
To analyze hypotheses H1-H6 respectively, the following institutional variables are 
analyzed: 
x Taxes too high: (QWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQs about high taxes being a barrier to the 
operation and growth of their business, using a Likert scale of 1 = no barrier and 5 = very 
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high barrier. Here, the responses ZLWK³high bDUULHU´ZHUHUHFRGHGWRDQGRWKHUZLVH
to produce a dummy variable.   
x Tax administration burden: (QWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQ DERXW WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WD[
administration burden as a barrier to the operation and growth of business, in a Likert scale 
of 1 = no barrier and 5 = very high barrier. Here, responses ZLWK³high bDUULHU´ZHUH
recoded to 1 and 0 otherwise to produce dummy variable. 
x Transparency in budget spending: a dummy variable, with value 1 if the entrepreneur 
answered, ³,GRQ¶WKDYHLQIRUPDWLRQKRZthe budget collected from taxes is spent´DQG
otherwise.  
x Tax authority inspections: a continuous variable indicating the perceived number of 
tax authority inspections per month a business receives. 
x Corruption: (QWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQ DERXW WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI FRUUXSWLRQ IRU
operation and growth of business in a Likert scale of 1 = no barrier and 5 = very high 
barrier. Here, responses ZLWK³KLJKbDUULHU´ZHUHUHFRGHGWRDQGRWKHUZLVHWRSURGXFH
a dummy variable.   
x Others do not pay taxes: a categorical variable with value of 1 for entrepreneurs who 
GHFODUHGWKDW³RWKHUHQWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHVDPHVHFWRUGRQRWSD\WD[HV´DQGRWKHUZLVH 
3.3.   Empirical model  
To estimate the factors influencing the underreporting of sales in Kosovo, we use 
econometric analysis based on two linear regression models, given that the dependent 
variable is a continuous variable that reports the percentage of unreported sales. Table 1 
below reports the results of OLS regressions for two specifications. The first specification 
includes individual- and firm-level variables; the second specification adds to these 
variables a range of institutional variables based on the above hypotheses, which reflect 
various institutionalist explanations for participation in informal entrepreneurship.   
In the first stage of the analysis, a baseline model with individual and firm level 
explanatory variables was estimated. Model 2 then includes the institutional explanatory 
variables. Adding the institutional variables significantly improves the explanatory power 
of the model. The final econometric model takes the following form:  
 ܷ݊ݎ݁݌݋ݎݐ݁݀  ݏ݈ܽ݁ݏ =  ߚ0 + ߚ1 ݅ܺ + ڮ .ߚ݊݊ +  ߝ݅ 
 
 
  
 
Where,  is the intercept, Xi represents the vector of independent variables and ߝ௜ is the 
error term. Xi consists of two JURXSVRIIDFWRUVLQIOXHQFLQJWKHILUPV¶JURZWK 
4.   Results 
The overall finding is that 35.7 percent of sales are under-reported in Kosovo. Hence, the 
informal economy is relatively larger in Kosovo compared with neighboring countries 
(Williams et al., 2017b). Therefore, this raises the questions: which entrepreneurs are more 
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likely to under-report sales and which institutionalist theories are valid? Before answering 
these questions, the diagnostic testing needs to be reported. This evaluates whether there is 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and non-normality, which may be the case because most 
of the variables in the estimated regression are dummies (see Hashi and Krasniqi, 2011). 
To deDOZLWKWKLVSUREOHPWKH³UREXVWVWDQGDUGHUURU´WHFKQLTXH was used based on the 
Huber-White sandwich estimates option, which does not assume identically distributed 
error terms (Hamilton, 2006).a In addition, multicollinearity was tested for using the 
Variable Inflated Factor (VIF) in STATA, which suggested multicollinearity was not a 
problem in our estimations (see Table A2). The VIF Mean =1.98, which is lower than the 
threshold of ten. In addition, the correlation matrix, presented in Table A3, confirms this 
because the correlations between individual variables are very low. Moreover, the 
explanatory power of the variables analyzed and as indicated by R-squared in Table 1, 
ranges from 3.1 percent (basic model) to 11.4 percent (full model), thereby meaning it 
explains more than eleven percent of variation in the dependent variable. This is usual in 
this type of cross-sectional data in transition economies. 
Therefore, who is more likely to under-report sales? Model 1 reports whether there is 
a significant association between the level of unreported sales and the individual- and firm-
level variables. Neither the gender, age nor education of the entrepreneur has a statistically 
significant effect on unreported sales in this Kosovo survey. Nor does whether they operate 
in an urban or rural environment. However, there is a statistically significant correlation 
between under-reported sales and firm age and size, respectively. Older firms state under-
reported sales are higher than younger firms. Indeed, for each one-point increase in firm 
age, sales under-reporting increases by 0.31 percentage points in model 1 (and 0.29 
percentage points in model 2). Meanwhile, sales under-reporting decreases as firm size 
increases. A one percent increase in firm size decreases the level of sales under-reporting 
by two percentage points. 
Model 2 adds to the individual- and firm-level variables the institutional variables, 
which are hypothesized to influence the level of sales under-reporting. This reveals that the 
two statistically significant variables in model 1 remain statistically significant (i.e., firm 
size and firm age) but gender now becomes statistically significant as well. Female 
entrepreneurs, on average, underreported sales 8.8 percentage points less than their male 
counterparts did.  
 
  
                                                          
a
 This is a common procedure when facing minor problems arising from heteroscedasticity or non-normality or 
from large residuals in observations because the OLS regression tends to fit outliers at the expenses of the rest of 
the sample (Hamilton, 2006). The main advantage of using the robust standard error option is that although 
estimates of the coefficients are exactly the same as those in ordinary OLS, the standard errors take account of 
heterogeneity and the lack of normality. 
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Table 1. Linear regression model of sales under-reporting in Kosovo 
Variables Model 1  
Basic model (Individual 
and firm level variables) 
Model 2  
(Individual, firm and 
institutional variables) 
Firm level:    
Gender (1= female) -2.522 (3.791) -8.853** (4.366) 
Age of the entrepreneur  0.0641 (0.127) 0.0191 (0.137) 
University education -4.043 (7.060) -9.880 (7.369) 
Secondary education -0.709 (6.798) -6.536 (7.123) 
Urban  3.571 (3.700) 4.581 (3.956) 
Firm age 0.310** (0.151) 0.293* (0.162) 
Firm size (Natural logarithm of size)  -1.962* (1.084) -2.089* (1.230) 
Institutional-level   
Taxes too high  5.402 (3.381) 
Tax administration is high burden   -0.413 (3.766) 
Tax authority inspections  0.158 (1.551) 
Transparency in budget spending   1.795 (3.197) 
Perceptions of corruption (vertical 
trust) 
 9.789*** (3.367) 
Others do not pay taxes (horizontal 
trust) 
 10.94** (5.424) 
Constant 33.45*** (10.42) 40.71*** (12.12) 
Observations 381 288 
R-squared 0.031 0.114 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Unreported sales 412 35.6 24.98 0 98 
Gender 501 0.17 .38 0 1 
Age of owner 487 38.05 11.43 19 71 
University education 501 .37 .48 0 1 
Secondary  501 .58 .49 0 1 
Urban 501 .87 .34 0 1 
Firm age 501 11.61 9.46 1 62 
Log firm size 471 1.27 1.20 0 6.91 
Taxes too high 501 .35 .48 0 1 
Tax administration burden 501 .25 .43 0 1 
Tax authority inspections 369 .97 .92 0 6 
Transparency in budget 
spending 
501 .32 .47 0 1 
Perceptions of corruption 501 .35 .48 0 1 
Others do not pay taxes 501 .07 .25 0 1 
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Table A2. Test for multicollinearity using the Variable Inflated Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
University education 6.97 0.143 
Secondary education 6.74 0.148 
Taxes too high 1.58 0.634 
Tax administration burden 1.55 0.644 
Age of owner 1.18 0.849 
Transparency how budget spent 1.09 0.913 
Gender 1.09 0.914 
Corruption 1.09 0.921 
No. of inspections 1.08 0.922 
Corruption 1.08 0.925 
Urban 1.07 0.938 
Others do not pay taxes 1.07 0.938 
Firm age 1.06 0.945 
Log firm size 1.03 0.975 
Mean VIF 1.98  
Table A3. Correlations among the Individual and Institutional Level Variables 
  1 2 3 4 
1. 1 2. Unreported sales 1.000    
3. 2 4. Gender -0.118 1.000   
5. 3 6. Age of owner 0.023 0.149 1.000  
7. 4 8. University education -0.084   -0.033   -0.136 1.000 
9. 5 10. Secondary  0.068   -0.006    0.045 -0.912 
11. 6 Urban 0.086   -0.121 -0.034 0.030 
12. 7 13. Firm age 0.092    0.019    0.234 -0.005 
14. 8 15. Log firm size -0.102    0.064   -0.042 -0.045 
16. 9 17. No. of inspections 0.009   -0.011 -0.058 0.003 
18. 10 19. Taxes high 0.141    0.006 -0.041 -0.086 
20. 11 21. Tax administration 0.084    0.122 0.065 0.001 
22. 12 23. Transparency in spending 0.044   -0.089 -0.047 -0.164 
24. 13 25.  Corruption 0.203    0.004 -0.078 0.041 
26. 14 27. Others do not pay taxes 0.110    0.119 0.050 -0.102 
Table A3 (continued). Correlations among the Individual and Institutional Level Variables 
  5 6 7 8 9 
28. 1 29. Unreported sales      
30. 2 31. Gender      
32. 3 33. Age of owner      
34. 4 35. University education      
36. 5 37. Secondary  1.000     
38. 6 Urban 0.012 1.000    
39. 7 40. Firm age 0.012 0.052 1.000   
41. 8 42. Log firm size -0.001 -0.056 0.010    1.000  
43. 9 44. No. of inspections -0.050 0.029 -0.065    0.063    1.000 
45. 10 46. Taxes high 0.076 -0.069 -0.066    0.004    0.119    
47. 11 48. Tax administration 0.015 -0.015 0.001   -0.019    0.066 
49. 12 50. Transparency in spending 0.138 0.041 0.036    0.023    0.113   
51. 13 52.  Corruption -0.029 0.070 -0.067    0.002    0.010    
53. 14 54. Others do not pay taxes 0.099 -0.035 -0.015   -0.036   -0.085    
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Table A3 (continued). Correlations among the Individual and Institutional Level Variables 
  10 11 12 13 14 
55. 1 56. Unreported sales      
57. 2 58. Gender      
59. 3 60. Age of owner      
61. 4 62. University education      
63. 5 64. Secondary       
65. 6 Urban      
66. 7 67. Firm age      
68. 8 69. Log firm size      
70. 9 71. No. of inspections      
72. 10 73. Taxes high 1.000     
74. 11 75. Tax administration 0.546    1.000    
76. 12 77. Transparency in spending -0.029   -0.005    1.000   
78. 13 79.  Corruption 0.231    0.209   -0.035 1.000  
80. 14 81. Others do not pay taxes 0.033    0.096   -0.085    0.035 1.000 
 
Turning to the first formal institutional failing, namely those resource misallocations 
and inefficiencies that result in entrepreneurs perceiving taxes as too high for the public 
goods and services they receive, the finding is that in Kosovo, there is no significant 
correlation between the eQWUHSUHQHXUV¶SHUFHSWLRQs that taxes are too high and the under-
reporting of sales (refuting H1). Neither is there a significant correlation between either of 
the institutional voids and weaknesses and the prevalence of sales underreporting. 
Entrepreneurs considering tax administration as bureaucratic and a burden and a barrier to 
business growth and operations do not have a higher under-reporting of sales (refuting H2) 
and neither do entrepreneurs who are fully informed about the budget spending of their 
taxes have less under-reporting of sales (refuting H3). Similarly, there is no statistically 
significant correlation between the power of authorities and the under-reporting of sales, 
reflected in the fact those perceiving there to be more tax authority inspections are not less 
likely to under-report sales (refuting H4).  
However, even if these formal institutional failures are not significantly correlated with 
sales under-reporting, refuting first-wave institutionalist explanations for participation in 
informal entrepreneurship, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
institutional asymmetry and sales under-reporting. When entrepreneurs lack trust in formal 
institutions, manifested in a perception that public sector corruption acts as a barrier to the 
operation and growth of their business, the level of sales under-reporting is significantly 
higher (confirming H5). As propounded by second-wave institutionalist thought, a lack of 
vertical trust (i.e., an asymmetry between formal and informal institutions) is significantly 
correlated with higher levels of sales under-reporting. Indeed, those lacking vertical trust 
and asserting corruption has a major impact on the operation and growth of their businesses 
have, on average, a 9.78 percentage point higher underreporting of sales than their 
counterparts who do not perceive corruption as having an impact.  
It is also the case, as propounded in the emergent third-wave institutionalist thought, 
that there is a statistically significant correlation between the level of horizontal trust and 
the level of sales under-reporting. Entrepreneurs who are more likely to view others as not 
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paying their taxes are more likely to underreport sales (confirming H6). Those 
entrepreneurs who are more likely to believe others do not pay taxes (i.e., who lack 
horizontal trust) have, on average, an eleven percentage points higher underreporting of 
sales than those who believe others pay their taxes. 
5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
Evaluating the various waves of institutional theory by reporting a 2013 survey of 
entrepreneurs in Kosovo, this study that reveals entrepreneurs under-report sales by 35.7 
percent finds no evidence to support first-wave institutionalist explanations but does find 
evidence to support second- and third-wave institutionalist explanations. Here, we report 
the theoretical and policy implications of these findings.  
Theoretically, this paper advances an institutionalist explanation of informal 
entrepreneurship in three ways. First, it reveals the first-wave of institutional thought, 
which explained informal entrepreneurship purely in terms of formal institutional failings, 
does not capture the reasons for entrepreneurship in the informal economy in Kosovo. 
Instead, and secondly, it has revealed that second-wave institutional theory, which depicts 
informal entrepreneurship to be associated with the asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions, is valid as an explanation. A lack of vertical trust by entrepreneurs in 
the formal institutions is a key explanation for the prevalence of sales under-reporting in 
Kosovo. Third, and reflecting emergent third-wave institutionalist thought, a lack of both 
vertical and horizontal trust results in a greater prevalence of sales under-reporting. 
Therefore, future scholarship on informal entrepreneurship will need to shift away from 
focusing on the formal institutional failures asserted to be determinants of informal 
entrepreneurship in first-wave institutionalist thought. Instead, there needs to be a focus on 
explaining informal entrepreneurship in terms of the lack of vertical trust (i.e., the 
asymmetry between formal and informal institutions), as discussed by second-wave 
thought, as well as the little discussed lack of horizontal trust (i.e., the lack of trust within 
informal institutions).    
This has important implications for policy. Until now, and largely resulting from the 
dominance of first-wave institutional thought, the major emphasis in policymaking has 
been on improving the formal institutions. This has predominantly involved attempts to 
improve the power of authorities. The way this has been pursued is by either using 
disincentives (³sticks´) to prevent informal entrepreneurship or incentives (³carrots´) to 
encourage formal entrepreneurship (Matthias et al., 2014). Conventionally, the main focus 
of governments has been on the use of disincentives to ensure the cost of being caught and 
punished is greater than the pay-off from participating in the informal economy (Allingham 
and Sandmo 1972). However, there is some evidence incentives are starting to be used to 
³bribe´ entrepreneurs to operate in the formal economy (Williams and Puts, 2017).  
However, the problem with this approach is that it does little to change the lack of 
vertical and horizontal trust, which are shown in this paper to explain informal 
entrepreneurship. Rather than adopt a low commitment, low trust and adversarial policy 
approach that pursues compliance through tight rules, prescribed procedures, close 
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supervision and monitoring, and centralized structures, perhaps there is a need for a high 
trust, high commitment policy approach that fosters self-regulation by seeking to align the 
norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs with the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions. This requires changes in the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs 
regarding the acceptability of under-reporting sales. To do so, three policy initiatives can be 
pursued. First, educating entrepreneurs regarding the value of operating in the formal 
economy to align their beliefs with the formal rules and elicit self-regulation is required 
(Saeed and Shah, 2011). Second, awareness raising and advertising campaigns about the 
benefits of formalization can be used. These can either inform entrepreneurs of the risks 
and costs of sales under-reporting or of the benefits of fully reporting sales. Finally, 
normative appeals to entrepreneurs can be used, which resulted in 46 percent of enterprises 
paying more taxes in Estonia during 2008 (Lill and Nurmela, 2009).  
However, to achieve greater symmetry between formal and informal institutions, both 
informal and formal institutions need to change. Entrepreneurs will not reduce their sales 
under-reporting if the widespread lack of trust in government and extensive corruption in 
the public sector and state capture persists. Hence, a modernization of governance is 
needed. At a minimum, this requires improvements in procedural fairness, which is the 
extent to which entrepreneurs believe they are paying their fair share compared with others 
(Molero and Pujol, 2012). Additionally, improvements in procedural justice²whether 
entrepreneurs believe the tax authority treat them in a respectful, impartial and responsible 
manner (Murphy, 2005)²and in redistributive justice ²whether entrepreneurs believe 
they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes they pay (Kirchgässner, 
2010).  
However, it is not just vertical trust that needs to be improved. There is also a need to 
improve horizontal trust. Until now, when governments publish estimates of the prevalence 
of the informal economy they have not considered this might well increase its size by 
further reducing horizontal trust. Therefore, greater caution is required when publishing 
such estimates. There is also a need to tailor awareness raising campaigns to prevent 
entrepreneurs from neutralizing their guilt about their own non-compliance. For example, 
to prevent a denial of responsibility and when publicizing estimates of the size of the 
informal economy, it may be that the average level of evasion among the non-compliant 
should be made public so informal entrepreneurs do not see themselves as a ³small fish´ 
engaged in minor discrepancies relative to others.  
The major limitation of this research is that it only evaluates the various waves of 
institutionalist thought in the context of one country, namely Kosovo. Future research 
needs to replicate this survey in other contexts because it is unknown whether similar 
findings result when analyzing other countries and other global regions. Moreover, there is 
a need to experiment more boldly with direct questions on whether entrepreneurs 
participate in the informal economy. Direct surveys of citizens show that, because informal 
economic activity is socially legitimate, even if illegal from the viewpoint of formal 
institutions, respondents openly discuss their participation in such endeavor (see Williams, 
2015). Whether this also applies when conducting surveys of entrepreneurs now needs to 
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be evaluated in future surveys by asking entrepreneurs more directly whether they under-
report sales.    
In sum, if this paper stimulates entrepreneurship scholars to conduct evaluations of 
institutionalist explanations of entrepreneurship in the informal economy in other contexts, 
it will have fulfilled a major intention. If this results in greater consideration of how 
governments can improve vertical and horizontal trust, and recognition by governments of 
this as the way forward, rather than simply using ³sticks´ to prevent informality and 
³carrots´ to promote formality, this paper will have fulfilled its wider intention.  
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